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ABSTRACT
We evaluate the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) and recent structural changes in the patterns
of hoarding international reserves (IR). We confirm that the determinants of IR hoarding evolve with
developments in the global economy. During the pre-GFC period of 1999-2006, gross saving is associated
with higher IR in developing and emerging markets. The negative impact of outward direct investment
on IR accumulation is consistent with the recent trend of diverting international assets from the international
reserve account into tangible foreign assets; the "Joneses' effect" lends support to the regional rivalry
in hoarding IR as a motivation; and commodity price volatility induces precautionary buffer hoarding.
During the 2007–2009 GFC period, previously significant variables become insignificant or display
the opposite effect, probably reflecting the frantic market conditions driven by financial instability.
Nevertheless, the propensity to import and gross saving continue to display strong and even larger
positive effects on IR holding. The results from the 2010–2012 post-GFC period are dominated by
factors that had been mostly overlooked in earlier decades. While the negative effect of swap agreements
and the positive effect of gross saving on IR holdings are in line with our expectations, we find a change
in the link between outward direct investment and IR in the pre- and post-crisis period. The macro-prudential
policy tends to complement IR accumulation. Developed countries display different demand behaviors
for IRs -- higher gross saving is associated with lower IR holding, possibly reflecting high-income
countries' tendency to deploy their savings in the global capital markets. The presence of sovereign
wealth funds motivates developed countries to hold a lower level of IR. Our predictive exercise affirms
that an emerging market economy with insufficient IR holdings in 2012 tends to experience exchange
rate depreciation against the U.S. dollar when many emerging markets were adjusted to the news of
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1. Introduction and Overview 
The global financial crisis (GFC) has ended the “great moderation” era, bringing 
instability to the fore of challenges facing policymakers in the U.S., the Eurozone, and other 
OECD countries—that is, volatility is back. Yet, for emerging markets, volatility never 
disappeared, and the GFC is another crisis in the long sequence of turbulent events, this time 
originating from the U.S. A key lesson of emerging markets’ growing financial integration has 
been a greater exposure to capital flight and sudden-stop crises.1 
After the financial crises of the late 1990s, many emerging markets increased their 
international reserves/GDP substantially, recognizing the benefits of self-insurance against the 
volatility associated with financial globalization. Indeed, the growing financial integration of 
emerging markets during the 1990s and the ensuing crises were identified as key factors in the 
structural changes in the motives to hold international reserves (IR), among which the weights of 
financial factors as well as the past crises history increased [Aizenman and Marion (2003), 
Aizenman and Lee (2007); Cheung and Ito (2008, 2009)]. The crises many emerging markets 
experienced in the late 1990s and early 2000s and the takeoff of reserves hoarding by China and 
other countries in the 2000s added new factors to the list of determinants of hoarding IR, 
including mercantilist motives [Aizenman and Lee (2008)], “keeping up with the Joneses,” 
[Cheung and Qian (2009)], and self-insurance against local residents’ flight from domestic assets 
in the context of the trilemma [Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2010); Aizenman, Chinn, and 
Ito (2010)]. 
This paper evaluates whether the GFC and recent structural changes in the global 
economic environment are associated with new patterns of hoarding IR. This possibility is 
exemplified in the recent experiences of China and South Korea, both of which have undergone 
large structural changes that have impacted their IR/GDP in the past decades. China became the 
largest IR holder in the mid-2000s, and held holds $3.8 trillion dollars, about 33% of the world’s 
total, as of April 2014 (see Figure 1). After the GFC, however, China has experienced a sizable 
decline in IR/GDP, resulting in a rebalancing of its export-led growth strategy in the face of 
declining global demand, a liberalization of its outward foreign direct investment, and the 
placing of greater emphasis on its sovereign wealth fund (SWF) [Aizenman, Jinjarak, and 
Marion (2014)].  
                                                 
1 See Calvo et al. (2004) on the empirics of sudden stops. 
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In contrast, during the GFC, South Korea found itself struggling with confidence amid its 
own banking crisis. Its sizable and once regarded sufficient stock of IR failed to isolate its 
economy from massive deleveraging. The ensuing financial panic was ultimately abated only 
with the help of the Fed’s offer of special swap lines. Arguably, the experience of Korea 
illustrated the need to supplement reserves hoarding with prudential regulations dealing with 
balance-sheet exposure of systemic banking. Indeed, unlike the 1997–1998 Korean crisis, the 
crisis this time did not lead to a further increase in Korea’s reserves/GDP but to prudential 
regulatory changes [(Park (2010), Bruno and Shin (2014)].  
The experiences of China and Korea raise the possibility that the GFC may have induced 
structural changes in the behavior of IR holding, possibly motivating some countries to 
supplement their hoarding of reserves with new policies [dynamic prudential regulations 
including preemptive capital controls] and institutions [financial stability boards and SWFs, 
among others]. These developments exemplify a growing trend among emerging markets. The 
GFC and the resultant quantitative easing [QE] policy by the Fed and other central banks also led 
to large, hot money inflows to emerging markets in search of yields. Emerging markets reacted 
to these developments by experimenting with dynamic capital controls aimed at mitigating the 
resultant appreciation pressure and reducing the exposure of future destabilizing outflows. These 
dynamic policy reactions also included relaxing controls on outward capital flows to defuse 
greater appreciation pressures from larger inflows, as has been the case in China and other 
emerging markets [Aizenman and Pasricha (2013)].  
The greater reliance on sovereign wealth funds (SWF) as a means to manage the public 
sector’s saving is another example of a possible supplement to IR hoarding, though it pre-dates 
the GFC. The impetus of instituting an SWF has been based on the recognition that the primary 
mandate of the central bank is to conduct monetary policy and ensure financial stability, not 
managing IR. Hence, the opportunity cost of reserves in practice may be of limited relevance for 
the central bank’s operations.2 Therefore, once the level of IR (as a share of GDP) reaches a 
level high enough to cover self-insurance needs, countries, usually those with high saving rates, 
may opt to manage their public saving in their own SWFs. Unlike the central bank authorities, 
the mandate of SWFs is to secure stable income for future generations; therefore, an SWF 
generally has a higher risk tolerance than the central bank, and aims for higher-than-expected 
                                                 
2  This also explains the failure in the literature to find a stable and economically significant impact of the 
opportunity cost of reserves on the observed international reserves/GDP ratios.   
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income and longer-term investments. Given these considerations, a higher savings rate could 
increase the level of IR/GDP,3 while the presence of SWFs may lower IR/GDP for a given 
savings rate.  
Against this background, we evaluate the stability of factors accounting for IR hoarding, 
and the roles of conditional variables that had not been sufficiently studied before the GFC, such 
as the presence of SWFs, macro-prudential policies, access to bilateral swap lines, saving rates, 
commodity terms of trade volatility, outward foreign investment, export composition (shares of 
fuel, commodity, services, or manufacturing exports in total exports), gross financial exposure, 
and the “keeping-up-with-the-Joneses” motive. 
Over time, the introduction of an SWF may reduce the exclusivity of IR as the main, or 
the only, financial buffer. Effective prudential regulations may reduce external borrowing and the 
inflows of hot money, thereby reducing the need for IR hoarding for self-insurance purposes. 
Accessibility to bilateral swap lines may also mitigate the need for IR at times of peril, although 
this applies only if the use of swap lines does not entail the stigma effect and if the swap-line 
arrangements are deemed durable. Export composition and terms of trade volatility matters in 
determining the volatility of trade and the real exchange rate, explaining patterns of pro-active, 
leaning-against-the-wind type of exchange rate and reserves policies.  
Previewing results, we group the explanatory variables into three broad factors. The 
traditional macroeconomic factors include the propensity to import, the volatility of IR holdings, 
the opportunity cost of holding IR, and exchange-rate regimes. These variables capture the 
elements of an international reserve- demand equation from vintage 1970s. The financial factors 
include domestic financial depth (measured by M2/GDP), external financing, cross-border 
capital flows, and capital controls on capital flows. The third group includes several factors that 
have come to the fore in recent discussions: the existence of national-level SWFs, bilateral 
currency-swap agreements, the implementation of macro-prudential policies, gross saving, 
outward direct investment, the composition of trade, the implicit-rivalry incentive (also known as 
the “catching-up-with-the-Joneses’ effect”), and the discounted experience of past financial 
crises.  
We confirm that the appropriate level of IR is not necessarily constant and determining 
                                                 
3  Political economy considerations suggest another channel linking a lower gross savings rate with lower 
IR/GDP; such a scarcity of saving would make it harder for the central bank to maintain sizable hoarding of IR, as 
the reserve stock may be an administration’s target of opportunity at times of a fiscal crunch, as has been the 
experience of Argentina and Venezuela [Aizenman and Marion (2004)].            
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factors continue to evolve with developments in the global economy. In 1999–2006, the pre-GFC 
period, gross saving is associated with higher international reserves in the developing and 
emerging markets; the outward direct-investment effect is consistent with the efforts of diverting 
international assets from the IR account into the purchase of more tangible foreign assets; the 
Joneses’ effect lends support to the implicit rivalry-hoarding motives; and commodity-price 
volatility induces IR hoarding against uncertainty while fuel exporters store their proceeds partly 
in the form of foreign reserves. During the 2007–2009 GFC period, many of the variables that 
are significant contributors to IR hoarding in the previous period become insignificant or display 
the opposite effect, probably reflecting the frantic market conditions that prevented a normal 
economic relationship to hold. Nevertheless, the propensity to import and gross saving continue 
to display strong positive effects (with greater magnitudes). The results for the post-GFC 2010–
2012 period are dominated by the “recently discussed factors.” While the negative effect of swap 
agreements and the positive effect of gross saving on the observed IR/GDP are in line with our 
expectations, the positive outward direct-investment effect implies a change in the link between 
outward direct investment and IR holding behavior in the pre- and post-crisis periods. Such a 
change deserves further analysis in future studies. The SWF seems to exert positive effect on IR 
accumulation. Some other findings are unexpected or not totally intuitive such as a negative 
Joneses’ effect among developing countries in Europe and the effect of banking-crisis experience. 
Interestingly, most of these non-intuitive results disappear – they become either insignificant or 
significant with the expected sign – when we pool the data from all the three subsample periods. 
In addition, in the entire sample period, the existence of macro-prudential policies is found to 
complement the IR-accumulation policy.  
We repeat the exercise using data from developed countries. In line with previous 
findings in the literature, the developed and developing countries display fairly different IR 
demand behaviors. We find that the IR hoarding behavior of developed countries is affected by 
the recently discussed factors, including SWFs, gross saving, the Joneses effect, and trade 
compositions, even in the pre-GFC period, though their results often differ from those of 
developing countries. For example, the presence of an SWF has different implications for the 
levels of IR holding of developed and developing countries in the pre-GFC years. Also, gross 
saving has a negative impact on IR accumulation of developed countries, possibly because these 
countries have better accessibility to the global capital market where they can invest their savings. 
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The Joneses effect is quite robust among both developed and developing Asian countries. 
Overall, the lists of significant variables are quite different between the groups of 
developed and developing countries. At the minimum, the statistical-demand specification for IR 
holdings not only evolves over time, but also differ between developed and developing countries. 
All these suggest that the two groups of countries have different motivations for holding IR 
because they face different economic realities. 
We close with an examination of the adequacy of IR holdings in the 2010–2012 period as 
was reflected in exchange market pressures. Our empirical analysis confirms that the “fragile 
five” countries (Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey) held fewer IR than our model 
predicted in this period. Such a situation reflects the vulnerability of these countries to global 
economic turbulences in the early 2010s. We test whether and to what degree economies with 
IR-holding levels below model predictions are susceptible to external shocks, focusing on the 
induced exchange rate depreciation against the U.S. dollar between 2012 and 2013, a period 
dominated by the news coming from the Fed that QE may be tapering soon. We confirm a 
negative and significant correlation between the exchange rate depreciation against the U.S. 
dollar and our proxy for over-hoarding of IR given by the prediction error of IR holdings. That is, 
if a country held an insufficient amount of IR, it tended to experience depreciation in its currency 
value when adjusting to the tapering news.  
Sections 2 and 3 outline the empirical specifications and report the estimation results. 
Section 4 compares the observed levels of IR hoarding with model predictions for several 
emerging markets, and examines the link between prediction errors in IR hoarding and exchange 
rate depreciation in 2012-2013. In Section 5, we reexamine the determinants of IR holding using 
different estimation techniques as robustness checks. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.  
 
2. Empirical Specifications 
Our analysis examines annual data of 95 countries, 22 developed countries and 73 
developing countries, from 1999 to 2012. Given the existing evidence that the IR demand 
behavior differs across different historical time periods partitioned by global events and between 
advanced and developing economies, we implement our empirical exercise for a) advanced and 
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developing economies separately, and for b) three disjointed sample periods; namely 1999-2006, 
2007-2009, 2010-2012.4  
2.1 Models 
We use the following regression equations to study the IR demand behavior: 
tir ,  = c + 1,' tiX   + 1,' tiY   + iD'   + ti , , and  (1) 
tir ,  = c + 1,' tiX   + 1,' tiY   + iD'   + 1,' tiZ   + ti , . (2) 
The variable of interest is ,i tr = , ,/i t i tR GDP , where ,i tR  and ,i tGDP  are, respectively, generic 
notations of economy i’s holding of IR and gross domestic product (GDP) at time t with both 
variables measured in U.S. dollars. Scaling IR as a ratio to GDP facilitates comparison across 
countries of different sizes. For brevity, we call the ratio ,i tr  international reserves (IR), 
henceforth.  
The four types of determinants are: a) ,i tX  (= , ,{ ; 1,..., })i k t xx k N includes the traditional 
macro variables, b) ,i tY  (= , ,{ ; 1,..., }i k t yy k N ) includes the financial variables, c) ,i tD  (=
, ,{ ; 1,..., }i k t dd k N ) includes other characteristics of the economies, and d) ,i tZ  (=
, ,{ ; 1,..., }i k t zz k N ) includes the possible determinants discussed during the GFC and afterwards. 
The definitions of these variables and their sources are given in Appendix 1. The coefficient 
vectors  ,  ,  , and   are conformable to the associated explanatory variables. The 
intercept and disturbance term are given by c and ti , , respectively.  
With (1) as a benchmark, the relevance of the determining factors that come to the fore 
during and after the GFC could be gauged by comparing results from (2) with those from (1). 
2.2 Explanatory Variables 
The traditional macroeconomic variables considered under Xit are motivated by existent 
studies on IR holding behavior, including Frenkel (1974a, b), Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981), 
Heller (1966), and Kelly (1970). These variables include the propensity to import, the volatility 
of IR holding, and the opportunity cost of holding IR. Thus, the Xit component of (1) captures the 
elements of an IR demand equation of the 1970s vintage. 
                                                 
4  Our sample period starts in 1999 based on the findings in Cheung and Ito (2008, 2009). They find that 
economies alter their IR holding behaviors before and after major global financial disturbances, and that the last 
global break point for IR holding is the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. They also find that the developed and 
developing countries displayed different IR hoarding behaviors; see also Bahmani-Oskooee (1988), Bussière, et al. 
(2014), Frenkel (1974a), Frenkel (1980), and Lizondo & Mathieson (1987). 
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The main economic characteristic (Dit) discussed in the subsequent literature is the 
exchange rate regime arrangement. Frenkel (1980) and Flood and Marion (2002), for example, 
report that exchange rate arrangements have effects on the holding of IR, while Lane and Burke 
(2001) find no significant effect. Other country-specific characteristics including the past crisis 
experiences are considered under Zit. 
Financial factors are playing an increasingly important role in the global economy in 
general, and influencing the behavior of IR holding in particular (Aizenman and Lee 2007). The 
financial variables in itY  include domestic financial depth (measured by M2/GDP) and external 
financing capacity measured by net portfolio investment position. The money stock in a 
developing economy is considered as a proxy for the potential magnitude of capital flight. 
Holding IR can act as a buffer against such “internal drain” and alleviate the adverse impact of 
sudden capital flight.5  
There are different views on the implications of external financing for IR holdings. One 
view is that economies with a large external financing exposure in the forms of debts or portfolio 
flows hold a high level of IR to guide against the possibility of reverse capital flow (Aizenman et 
al., 2007; Feldstein, 1999).6 However, if external financing is a substitute for foreign reserves, 
then the correlation between the two variables will be negative.  
The variations in IR holdings observed during and after the GFC have led to further 
discussions on the determination of the appropriate amount of IR. The variable Zit includes 
determining factors that received more attention among researchers in the recent discussions. 
Countries may institute sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) to hold and manage their external 
assets. Typically, the monetary authorities use their IR to fund an SWF, suggesting that the 
existence of an SWF can be negatively correlated with the level of IR holding. However, the 
possibility of shifting external assets to an SWF offers a way to divert political pressures on 
excessive IR holding. If it is the case, then IR holding could even increase in the presence of a 
SWF. To assess its role, we include the dummy variable that represents the presence of 
national-level SWFs in our empirical analysis.7 In passing, we note that the use of the SWF 
                                                 
5  See, for example, de Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001), Calvo (1998, 2006), Aizenman and Lee 
(2007), and Obstfeld, et al. (2009) 
6  Dooley et al. (2005, 2009), based on the Bretton Woods II system argument, note that external financing 
flows and levels of IR hoarding are positively related. 
7  The information is from the SWF Institute (http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/). Canadian or 
American SWFs are not included in the analysis because they are all managed by provincial or state level authorities, 
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tenure does not change the results reported below. 
Bilateral currency swap agreements are another factor. If a country has access to hard 
currencies via a currency swap arrangement, then it may have a weak incentive to hold IR. We 
collect the from official websites information on bilateral swap agreements (regardless of the 
currency of the agreement) signed since the breakout of the 2008 global financial crisis.  
The desire or the need to hold IR could be affected by the implementation of macro 
prudential policies, which have attracted considerable discussions in the global community in the 
aftermath of the GFC (Ostry et al., 2010; Ostry et al., 2011; The Strategy, Policy, and Review 
Department, IMF, 2011). We include a qualitative variable that assumes a value of one if a 
country implemented any of the macro prudential policies based on the information in Lim, et al. 
(2012, 2013).  
Countries with a high level of gross saving tend to run a current account surplus, and 
accumulate IR, unless they are purposefully investing the surplus abroad. Thus, a country’s 
saving could be indicative of the level of IR holding. By the same token, a policy of promoting 
outward direct investment (ODI) is one means to deploy international assets overseas. Hence, the 
level of ODI can be negatively correlated with the level of IR holding. In the subsequent 
empirical analyses, both gross saving and ODI are expressed as a ratio to GDP.  
Besides the usual economic considerations, the implicit rivalry incentive could drive 
countries to accumulate IR in a “competitive” manner. Machlup (1966) first noted the so-called 
“catching-up-with-the-Joneses effect,” and the Joneses effect was revived by Cheung and Qian 
(2009) and Cheung and Sengupta (2011). Given the regional characteristics of the Joneses effect, 
we allow for countries in different regions to display different Joneses effects by interacting the 
Joneses variables with the corresponding regional dummy variables.8 
The composition of trade, in addition to trade intensity, can affect the IR hoarding 
behavior. Hence, we explore the possible effects of the shares of fuel, commodity, or 
manufacturing exports in total exports, commodity terms of trade volatility, and the relative share 
of goods to services exports. 
We also control for the potential effects of past experiences of currency and/or banking 
crises. For each type of crisis, we use a dummy variable for the crisis experience in the preceding 
                                                                                                                                                             
and are thereby not supposed to affect the holding of international reserves at the country level. 
8  The regions are: “North and South America,” “Europe,” which includes Western, Central, and Eastern 
Europe, “East and South Asia,” “Middle-east and North Africa,” and “Sub-Saharan Africa.”   
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five-years (that is, t-1 to t-5), and calculate Dc(t-1) + .95* Dc(t-2) + .90*Dc(t-3) + .85*Dc(t-4) 
+ .80*Dc(t-5), where Dc(.) = 1 if there is a crisis, and = 0, otherwise. In essence, we assume that the 
memory of a crisis among policy makers “depreciates” at the annual rate of 5%. 
 Most of these data are extracted from the World Development Indicator, International 
Financial Statistics, and the IMF’s World Economy Outlook. See Appendix 1 for detail. 
 
3. Estimation Results 
 Our discussion is focused on the estimation results of developing countries. The results of 
developed countries are included mainly for comparison purposes.  
3.1 Basic Results – Developing Countries 
Table 1 summarizes the results of estimating equation (1); that is, the estimation without 
the newly focused variables (Zit), for the subsample of developing countries. We estimate the 
model with country-fixed effects because the Hausman test chooses a fixed effects specification 
over a random effects specification. To avoid the endogeneity issue, all the right-hand-side 
variables are lagged by one year. We choose the model specification in Table 1 using the 
following strategy. First, in the pre-test stage, we consider the 1999-2006 period, and examine all 
the possible traditional macroeconomic, financial, and (institutional) characteristics variables; 
that is, Xit, Yit, and Dit. We sequentially drop insignificant variables, and come up with the 
specification reported in column 2 of the table. Then, we fit the same model to the sample 
periods of 2007-09, 2010-12, and 1999-2006. 
 A few observations are in order. First, in the 1999-2006 subsample, the positive effect of 
the propensity to import variable suggests that a higher level of IR is expected to cover a higher 
level of imports (Frenkel, 1974b). The negative reserve volatility effect, however, is different 
from the prediction of the buffer stock model of IR (Frenkel and Jovanovic, 1981). In the current 
panel setting, the negative effect could be associated with the anecdotal observation that large 
variations in a developing country’s IR are usually caused by large drawn downs.  
In addition to the internal drain and capital flight interpretation, the positive money 
supply stock effect is also in line with the early monetarist model of balance of payments that 
predicts an excess demand for money leads to an increase in IR (Courchene and Youssef, 1967; 
Johnson, 1958). The other financial variable, the net value of portfolio liabilities, on the other 
hand, has a significantly negative effect on IR holdings. One possible interpretation is that, on 
average, developing countries treat IR and portfolio flows as substitutes. 
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Second, the performance of these explanatory variables in the tranquil 1999-2006 period 
is quite different from their performance during the GFC crisis and post-crisis sample periods. 
The coefficient estimates of these variables change in terms of the magnitude, the sign, and the 
level of significance. For instance, during the 2007-2009 crisis period, the propensity to import is 
the only significant variable. During the post-crisis period, the import propensity effect becomes 
negative – a finding that is counter-intuitive.9 When we pool the three sample periods, the 
estimation results resemble those of the pre-GFC 1999-2006 period, with the exception that the 
net portfolio liabilities show no significant effect. 
These results reinforce the previous findings that the IR demand function as well as its 
determinants are evolving over time (Cheung and Ito, 2008, 2009). Apparently, authorities 
respond to market conditions and adjust their reserve hoarding behavior accordingly. That is, the 
level of IR that is deemed sufficient is not necessarily constant. 
3.2 The “New” Factors – Developing Countries 
Here, we examine the results pertaining to the variables in Zit; that is, determining factors 
which have received considerable attention during the GFC and in its aftermath.  
We augment the first estimation model shown in Table 1 with the elements of Zit along 
with the variables from X, Y, and D that were found significant. As we did previously, we started 
with all the variables (shown in Appendix 1) and sequentially dropped insignificant variables 
until we obtained a parsimonious representation comprised only significant explanatory variables. 
We repeated the exercise for each of the sample periods, and reported the results in Table 2 for 
developing countries and Table 3 for developed countries. 
One obvious observation is that the “newly discussed” variables (Zit) have different 
effects over different sample periods.10 Although these variables are labeled as “recently 
discussed” factors, some of these variables are statistically significant even in the pre-GFC 
period. For example, gross saving has the expected positive sign in all the sample periods. This 
result lends support to the view that, for developing countries, a high level of national saving 
leads to a better current account balance and a higher level of IR holding.11 
                                                 
9  The negative effect of the propensity to import is consistent with Heller’s (1966) argument that the demand 
for IR should be negatively related to the marginal propensity to import because a higher propensity to import (m) 
implies a smaller marginal cost of balance of payments adjustment (that is, 1/m).  
10  Indeed, the Chow tests confirm that the estimation models from different subsample periods are 
significantly different from each other; that is, there are structural changes in the set of explanatory variables over 
time. These results are available upon request. 
11  That implies that financial account is relatively closed compared to current account, which is often the case 
11 
The outward direct investment effect in the pre-GFC years is consistent with the view 
that investing overseas helps divert international assets from IR accumulation. As anticipated, the 
Joneses effect varies across different regions and over different time periods. The Joneses effects 
for Asian countries in the pre-GFC and full sample periods echo the results reported in Cheung 
and Qian (2009). However, the region’s rivalry-driven IR hoarding motive reverses its sign 
during the crisis period. Countries in other regions do not display a stable Joneses effect across 
the sample periods, either.  
The two commodity-related variables, the manufactured exports ratio, and the two crisis 
variables do not perform consistently across the sample periods, though fuel exports seem to be a 
positive factor especially in the pre-GFC period. The negative banking crisis effect is somewhat 
difficult to interpret, but it may suggest that a country that experienced a banking crisis in the 
past tends to experience persistent external drain. 
During the 2007-9 crisis period, some of the variables found significant in the pre-crisis 
period become insignificant, some insignificant variables become significant, while some 
continue to be significant but display the opposite effect. The change in the performance of these 
variables may not be surprising because the crisis-driven frantic market conditions could prevent 
normal economic relationships from holding. Nevertheless, the propensity to import and gross 
saving continue to display a strong positive effect even with greater magnitudes. 
The result from the post-crisis 2010-2012 period may be the most surprising one. The list 
of significant variables is dominated by the factors included in Zit. Interestingly, signing on a 
bilateral currency swap agreement with a major central bank negatively contributes to IR 
accumulation, suggesting that currency swap agreements can supplement IR accumulation.12 
Given the negative effect of swap agreements is found in the immediate aftermath of the GFC, 
we conjecture that the negative effect is not driven by stigma (or possibly resultant speculative 
attacks) from signing on the agreements. Rather, we can stipulate that a swap agreement can 
relax liquidity constraint and ensure accessibility to a hard currency when there is liquidity 
shortage. The access to hard currencies is especially helpful when the global economic 
                                                                                                                                                             
for many developing countries including China. 
12  We include a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a country has a bilateral currency swap 
agreement with a major central bank (regardless of the currency of the agreement) such as the Fed, the ECB, and the 
Bank of Japan. This dummy variable does not refer to the currency swap agreements with the People’s Bank of 
China because the Chinese renminbi is not capital account convertible and, thus, does not provide liquidity to the 
same extent as major hard currencies do. 
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conditions are still fragile in the immediate aftermath of the GFC. Hence, a swap agreement 
provision allows countries to hold less of IR than they would otherwise.  
We continue to find the positive effect of gross saving in the post-crisis period, signifying 
the important role of saving. The positive outward direct investment effect, however, implies a 
change in the link between outward direct investment and IR hoarding in the pre- and post-crisis 
periods. Such a change deserves further analysis in future studies.  
As far as the post-GFC years are concerned, having an SWF seems to have a positive 
externality on IR accumulation. However, the estimate is found to be significantly negative in the 
full sample period, which is more in line with our priors, making the positive externality only 
unique to the post-GFC period. 
Interestingly, when we pool the data from the three sample periods, most of the 
non-intuitive results in the crisis- and immediate post-crisis periods disappear (either become 
insignificant or significant with the expected sign). In addition, the macro prudential policy is 
found to complement the IR accumulation policy while having an SWF could divert international 
assets from IR accumulation.13 
3.3 The Developed Countries 
 We repeat the same exercise for the sample of developed countries and present the results 
in Table 3. In accordance with the past literature, developed and developing countries display 
different IR demand behaviors in each of the sample periods.  
 For developed countries, some of the “recently discussed” factors, such as SWFs, gross 
saving, the Joneses effect, and trade compositions affect the reserve hoarding behavior, even in 
the pre-GFC period. However, the estimated effects reported in Table 3 are different from those 
of developing countries in Table 2. For example, the presence of an SWF decreases the level of 
IR holding in the pre-GFC years, and gross saving has a negative impact on IR accumulation. 
The different saving effect may be caused by the fact that developed countries have better 
accessibility to the global capital market where they can invest their savings. The Joneses effect 
is quite robust among the Asian countries, a common characteristic between developed and 
developing countries. 
 Overall, the lists of significant variables in Tables 2 and 3 are quite different. Besides 
                                                 
13  We also investigated the effect of IMF stabilization measures by including a country-specific dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if a country receives non-concessional loans from the IMF in year t. However, 
this dummy variable is not statistically significant in any of the models considered. 
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gross saving, the contrasting results of the opportunity cost and M2 variables are noteworthy; 
among developed countries, both variables have negative impacts on IR accumulation. In a 
country with more developed financial markets, that can be suggested by a higher level of M2 
(as a share of GDP), holding a large amount of IR can involve higher levels of foregone 
investment opportunities. This also explains why the estimate on the opportunity cost is 
significantly negative in all the sample periods except for the pre-GFC period, a result consistent 
with theoretical predictions and in contrast with the case of developing countries in the 2007-09 
crisis period. Other variables with conflicting results compared to developing countries include 
bilateral swap agreements and banking crisis experience.  
 
4.  Prediction Exercises 
4.1  Are Developing Countries Over- or Under-Hoarding International Reserves? 
In the last two decades or so, economists and policymakers alike have been debating on 
the issue of the adequacy of IR holding. While holding an insufficient level of IR can trigger 
economic and financial instabilities, excessive hoarding of reserves can lead to over-heating of 
the domestic economy and contribute to global economy instability. An overarching issue of the 
debate is how to determine the ‘sufficient’ level of IR, either theoretically or empirically. While 
the debate on what level of IR constitutes a ‘sufficient’ level cannot be settled, at the very least, 
we can provide a statistical benchmark based on the past historical patterns of IR holding so as to 
obtain some inferences about whether the actual level of IR holding is too high or too low. 
The estimation results in the previous section clearly show that the empirical IR demand 
function has evolved over time, including different sets of factors as the determinants in different 
time periods. Thus, even if we wanted to estimate a benchmark level of IR as a reference point, 
the estimated degree of over- or under-hoarding would depend upon which empirical model to 
compute the benchmark. Nonetheless, we use our estimated models to generate the predicted 
levels of IR and compare them with the actual levels of IR hoarding. 
Figure 2 plots predicted levels of IR holdings for selected individual countries and 
countries groups based on the estimated models reported in Table 2 for different sample periods 
and, the corresponding actual levels. . The individual countries include Argentina, China, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand, and the “Fragile Five” of Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and 
Turkey. The country groups are the developing Asia excluding China, Latin America, and 
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emerging market economies. 14 For each specification, we generate the in-sample and 
out-of-sample forward, but not backward, predictions. For example, by using the model 
estimated for the 2007-2009 sample, we generate in-sample predictions for 2007 to 2009, and 
out-of-sample predictions for 2010 to 2012.  
Regarding these graphs, we must note that the predictions are generated without 
country-fixed effects, though the estimations are conducted with country-fix effects. We conceive 
that predictions made without country-fixed effects would resemble the way international 
investors compare cross-country investment destinations for arbitrage opportunities. One could 
argue that predictions with country-fixed effects are relevant only for assessing whether the path 
of actual holdings of IR are higher or lower relative to their historical tendencies. However, 
international investors would also compare the levels of IR holding across countries so that they 
could react to market signals and reorganize their portfolios when necessary. 
 Let us consider the period of 2010 to 2012. In the figure, we can see that, among the 
predictions of the demand for IR estimated for the four sample periods, the predictions for the 
1999-2006 and 1999-2012 periods tend to resemble each other, reflecting the estimation results 
in Table 2. For some individual countries or country groups, predictions from the 2007-2009 or 
2010-2012 specifications differ greatly from those of either 1999-2006 or 1999-2012 
specifications.  
These plots confirm that whether a country is under- or over-hoarding IR depends on 
which estimation model to use to compute the benchmark. For example, during the 2010-2012 
period, China appears to hold IR far more than those predicted by the model estimated for the 
2007-2009 period, but less than what is predicted by the other three specifications, especially the 
1999-2006 model. Figure 2 shows similar results for other Asian economies and the group of 
ex-China Asian developing economies. In short, Figure 2 suggests that many of the countries 
displayed in the figure appear to “under-hoard” IR according to the benchmarks based on either 
1999-2006 or 1999-2012 specifications. These results suggest that the behavior of IR holding for 
these countries may have experienced a regime shift after the GFC. 
Table 4 allows us to take a closer look at the IR holding behavior in reference to the 
different benchmarks by reporting the averages of prediction errors in 2010-2012 for the same 
countries as in Figure 2 and the country groups of “Emerging Asia,” “Western Europe,” Eastern 
                                                 
14  For the country groups, we presented simple cross-country averages of actual and predicted IR holdings.  
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and Central Europe,” “Emerging Latin America,” “Fragile Five,” and “BRICS.”15 The first four 
columns report the 2010-2012 averages of prediction errors while the errors do not incorporate 
country-fixed effects. The second four columns report the 2010-2012 averages of prediction 
errors, but the errors do reflect country-fixed effects.16 As we have discussed previously, the 
errors without country-fixed effects are more suitable for cross-country comparison, but those 
with country-fixed effects are suggestive of over- or under-hoarding from historical perspectives 
for each country. 
The country group averages of prediction errors without country-fixed effects suggest 
that the country groups of Emerging Asia, Fragile Five, and BRICS appear to hold fewer IR than 
the predictions using either the 1999-2006 or 1999-2012 model, implying that these country 
groups may have experienced a significant change in the behavior of IR holding after the GFC. 
The result is somewhat surprising in view of the anecdotal argument that massive IR allowed 
emerging Asian economies to be resilient to the GFC. However, the result for this group is 
mainly driven by the results of India, Indonesia, and Korea.17 Figure 3, which compares the 
actual and predicted levels of IR holding for the 1999-2006 and 1999-2012 models, confirms the 
result graphically.  
However, the prediction errors that incorporate country-fixed effects give us a more 
nuanced picture. The ‘under-hoarding’ countries based on the 1999-2006 or 1999-2012 models 
are now reduced to India, Indonesia, Korea, and Malaysia. Countries like China and Thailand are 
not ‘under-hoarding’ compared to their historical patterns. Among the country groups, according 
to the 1999-2006, only the Fragile Five appears to be under-hoarding compared to its pre-GFC 
patterns. 
Figure 2 confirms the under-hoarding of IR by “Fragile Five,” that could be viewed by 
the market as vulnerable to the reverse of the U.S. quantitative easing (QE) policy. These five 
countries tend to be deficient in IR holding during the period of 2010-2012; they usually appear 
to be under-hoarding by three of the four specifications. Combined with the results in Table 3 
and Figure 3, among the Fragile Five, India and Indonesia particularly appear vulnerable, 
justifying the market’s concern over these economies’ deteriorating current account conditions. 
 
                                                 
15  “BRICS” comprises Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. 
16  The in-sample country fixed effects are used in the process of calculating these errors. 
17  Sri Lanka and Pakistan, both included in the Emerging Asia group, also displayed IR under-hoarding based 
on the 1999-2006 and 1999-2012 specifications. 
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4.2  International Reserve Holdings and Currency Depreciation 
How are the countries vulnerable to external financial shocks doing lately? In recent 
years, emerging market economies have ambivalent feelings about the spillovers from advanced 
economies. On the one hand, emerging market economies should benefit from the recovery of 
advanced economies, which are their important trading partners after all. On the other hand, with 
recovery underway, the advanced world will trigger the tapering policy to end the extremely low 
interest rate policy, which could in turn cause massive capital outflow from emerging market 
economies. Indeed, on May 22, 2013 the world witnessed the adverse effect of tapering on 
emerging financial markets when the comment by the Federal Reserve chairman Ben S. 
Bernanke on the possibility of tapering the QE policy ended up jittering the emerging economies. 
As amplified in the media, economies that are financially vulnerable, including the 
Fragile Five discussed above, have been experiencing economic and financial stresses. One sign 
of economic and financial stresses is exemplified by the falling value of the domestic currency 
which is caused by concerns over anticipated capital outflow and possible deteriorating 
economic performance. 
Although our estimation results do not answer definitely the question of whether or to 
what extent a country is holding too much or too little IR, they can shed light on the relative 
sufficiency or deficiency of IR hoarding. To investigate the issue, we study the possible links 
between our estimates of IR holding and the observed exchange rate movements. Specifically, 
we investigate whether the currency stress is associated with the relative levels of IR holding to 
our predictions, which we interpret as a barometer of a country’s vulnerability to external 
financial shocks. 
Figure 4 displays scatter diagrams of the magnitude of the U.S. dollar exchange rate 
depreciation against the degree of over-hoarding of IR, which is measured by the prediction error 
based on our estimated models. The prediction errors, or the proxies for “over-hoarding,” are 
defined as the difference between the actual and predicted levels of IR – a positive difference 
implies over-hoarding and a negative one under-hoarding. If a prediction error is a reasonable 
measure of vulnerability to external financial shocks, a fall in the prediction error should be 
associated with a rise in the exchange rate (that is, currency depreciation). 
The scatter plots of the annual averages of exchange rate depreciation observed during 
the year of 2013 and the over-hoarding proxies for the period of 2010-2012 display different 
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patterns depending on the estimation model to use. For instance, the proxies derived from the 
2010-2012 model (Panel C) exhibit a wide dispersion relative to those from other model 
specifications. Nonetheless, a (weak) negative association of the two variables could be 
visualized in these four scatter plots. 
To shed additional insight, we regress the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate against 
the U.S. dollar on the proxy for IR over-hoarding, and report the results in Table 5. Two types of 
over-hoarding proxies are considered: one is the average of the 2010 to 2012 values, and the 
other is the proxy value as of 2012.     
The estimation results lend support to the visual inspection that the two variables are 
negatively related. When we use the proxy average of the 2010 to 2012 period, all coefficient 
estimates are negative and, with the exception of the 2010-2012 case, statistically significant. 
The explanatory power, as given by the adjusted R-squared estimates, ranges from 0% to 6% for 
the significant cases. Apparently, the information conveyed by the 2012 proxy for over-hoarding 
has a stronger impact for exchange rate depreciation than the one embedded in the annual 
averages of 2010 to 2012. Generally, the adjusted R-squared estimates are higher as well. 
Based on the presumption that the market will drive down the currency value of a country 
experiencing signs of external vulnerability and a resultant fall in IR holding, our findings either 
lend support to this presumption or are indicative of the relevance of the estimated demand 
models for international reserves (with the 2010-2012 model as a likely exception). A strong 
inference is that, if a country holds a deficient amount of international reserves, it tends to 
experience currency depreciation. Furthermore, the outcome will be reinforced by foreign 
exchange market interventions conducted by countries’ monetary authorities that would further 
deplete the holding of reserves. 
 
5. Additional Analyses 
5.1 A Robustness Check with the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
Admittedly, we considered a large number of potential explanatory variables to 
investigate the reserve holding behavior. The regression analysis may suffer from the issues 
associated with the curse of dimensionality. Although the correlation between the reported 
explanatory variables is usually not strong, some members of the original set of potential 
explanatory variables overlap with others conceptually or qualitatively (for example, the share of 
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fuel in total exports and that of commodity exports), and thus can display a high level of 
association with each other. Hence, it is worthwhile assessing the robustness of the estimation 
results by controlling for potential multicollinearity.  
To reduce the dimensionality, we consider principal components (PCs) of individual 
groups of potential explanatory variables instead of the variables themselves in the regression 
analysis. Principal component analysis (PCA) is a statistical tool that extracts PCs, which are 
orthogonal linear combinations of a set of variables based on their ability to capture the 
variations of these variables. While each of the PCs is correlated with some of the original 
variables, PCs are orthogonal to each other. Applying PCA to p number of variables would yield 
p number of PCs. However, usually, using some threshold (e.g., the Kaiser criterion), only a 
fewer number of PCs than p could be chosen because they are sufficient enough to cover most of 
the variation of all the original variables. In short, PCA has the benefit of reducing the dimension 
of the parameter space with a minimum loss of information. See Appendix 2 and Anderson 
(2003) for additional discussions of PCA. 
To have a better understanding of how to apply this methodology in our context, let us 
think about the following hypothetical case. Assume that the level of IR hoarding (as a share of 
GDP: ,i tr ) is estimated as a function of {x1 (-), x2 (+), x3 (-), x4 (+), x5 (+)} with the estimated signs 
shown in parentheses. When we apply PCA to x’s, it turns out that we get the first and second 
PCs (PC1 and PC2) as the PCs that sufficiently covers the variations of the original x’s. We also 
find PC1 highly positively correlated with x2 and x4 and PC2 negatively with x1 and x3. If we 
regress ,i tr  on PC1 and PC2, as long as the estimates on both PC1 and PC2 are positive, we 
could conclude that such a finding is consistent with the original estimation, because the signs 
are consistent. 
Using the PCA, we extracted the PCs of the group of macroeconomic/financial variables 
and the group of trade/industrial structure and obtain PCs.18 Table A1 in Appendix 2 reports the 
                                                 
18  See Appendix 2 for selection criteria. We combined the macro/traditional variable group (Xit) and the 
financial variable group (Yit) into one variable group and extracted thier PCs. Also, as Appendix 2 shows, we 
included some of the “recently discussed” variables in Zit, such as gross saving, outward direct investment, and the 
crisis variables, in this group as well because it is reasonable to expect these variables are correlated with each other. 
By extracting PCs from a large number of variables, we obtain large variable reduction effects. We do not extract 
PCs from dummy variables of sovereign wealth funds, bilateral swap agreements, macro-prudential policies, and 
fixed or crawling peg exchange rate regimes because applying PCA to discrete variables may bias the estimates 
(Kolenikov and Angeles, 2004). 
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selected PCs of the sample of developing countries for all the four subsample periods.19 Thirteen 
macroeconomic or finance-related variables are reduced to six PCs for the 1999-2006 and 
1999-2012 samples, and to five PCs for the 20007-2009 and 2010-2012 subsamples. Five trade 
or industrial structure variables are reduced to two PCs in all the subsamples.20  
Using these selected PCs and the other potential explanatory variables, we repeated the 
same regression analyses underlying Tables 2 and 3, and reported the resulting parsimonious 
models in Table A2 of Appendix 2. Column (2) in each panel of the table reports the results of 
the estimations where the variables that are not highly correlated with any of the PCs are 
included in the estimation. 21  For the 1999-2006 sample, PC2, PC3, and PC4 of the 
macro/finance variables are significant. PC2 is found to be a positive contributor to IR holdings 
(Table A2) and it is positively correlated with net FDI liabilities and gross saving (Table A1); 
implying that both net FDI liabilities and gross saving are positive contributors to IR holdings. 
The implied gross saving effect is consistent with the finding reported in Table 2. These results 
indicate that gross saving is a robust variable - it is a significant factor in both the simple OLS 
estimation and the regression with PCs. 
Table 6 summarizes the comparison of the estimation results. The “OLS-FE” column 
reports the signs of the significant estimates found when individual variables are used in the OLS 
estimation with country-fixed effects (Table 2). The “PC” column reports the implied signs 
inferred from OLS exercises with PCs (Tables A1 and A2). For instance, gross saving, net 
portfolio liabilities, the Joneses variables for Asia and Europe, and the share of fuel exports (in 
total exports) displayed the same signs from both estimation exercises in the 1999-2006 period.22  
Overall, the models that include PCs perform relatively well. The within R-squares 
estimates of the models with PCs are close to those of the OLS-FE models. For all the subsample 
periods, except for the 2007-2009 period, the signs of many significant variables under the 
OLS-FE specifications are the same as those implied by the OLS-PC exercise. The 2007-2009 
exception is likely due to the instability of estimation results during the GFC period. It is 
                                                 
19  To conserve space, the results of the developed country group are not reported. They are available from the 
authors upon request. 
20  Component loadings, that is, correlations between the original variables and PCs, with absolute value 
smaller than .40 are omitted from presentation for easier interpretation. Hence, the tables show only relatively high 
correlations. 
21  The low levels of correlation suggest they are relatively orthogonal to the chosen PCs. 
22  M2/GDP has the consistent sign when it is included in the estimation in addition to the PCs. Note that none 
of the PCs is highly correlated with M2/GDP (column (2) of TableA2(a)).  
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noteworthy noting that most of the “recently-discussed” variables that were found significant in 
the OLS-FE estimations, such as gross saving, Joneses variables, and the dummies for SWF, 
bilateral swap agreements, and macro-prudential policies, are significant in the estimations with 
PCs. 
Lastly, we calculated the predicted errors of IR holdings, which we use as proxies of 
reserve over-hoarding, using the estimation results of Table A2. We then regressed the rate of 
exchange rate depreciation against the U.S. dollar on these estimated errors. Comparable to the 
results reported in Table 5, the estimated errors from the specifications with PCs are significant 
predictors of currency depreciation for all the four subsample periods when the average rate of 
depreciation during the 2010-2012 period is considered. For the 2012 rate of depreciation, the 
estimated errors from the 2010-12 or 1999-2012 model are significant predictors.23 
5.2 Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) 
 While the choice of a parsimonious model based on the statistical significance of 
parameter estimates seems reasonable, one may say the approach does not explicitly allow for 
model uncertainty. Suppose there are p possible explanatory variables. These p variables give 
rise to 2p possible model specifications, iM  that form the model space M = { 1M , 2M , …, 
2pM }. As long as the process of selecting appropriate explanatory variables involves some 
degree of uncertainty, there is uncertainty about which one of these 2p models is the true model.24 
 The Bayesian Model Average (BMA) methodology accounts for such model uncertainty 
in assessing parameter estimates. In essence, the estimate of a parameter is a weighted average of 
its estimates from all the 2p possible model specifications, with the weight of each estimate 
determined by the performance of the model from which it is obtained. See, for example, 
Hoeting, et al. (1999), Luca and Magnus (2011), Hoeting (2002), and Montgomery and Nyhan 
(2010) for a detailed discussion of the methodology.25 
For each sample period, we labelled the variables that are significant in Table 2 as the 
“focus regressors,” and other insignificant candidate variables as the “auxiliary regressors.” 
                                                 
23  The results are qualitatively the same when estimated errors incorporating country-fixed effects are used. 
Indeed, the predicted levels of reserve holdings from the specifications using a) individual variables and b) PCs have 
a level of correlation of 90%, except for the 2007-2009 period (76%).  
24  The decision of which variable to be excluded involves a trade-off between bias and precision of the 
estimators of the variables included in the model (“focus variables”). 
25  Fernández, et al. (2001) on growth model is one of the few economics studies that used the BMA 
methodology. 
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Following the literature, the focus regressors are those believed to be more certain to be in the 
regression than the auxiliary variables. The BMA estimation will be based on all the possible 
variable combinations and comes up with the weighted averages of the estimates obtained from 
these possible model specifications.  
Table 7 reports the BMA estimates and their corresponding posterior inclusion 
probabilities (“PIPs”). The PIP is the posterior probability of including a variable in the model. 
Under each sample period heading, the estimates of focus regressors are presented first (above 
the line) followed by those of auxiliary regressors (below).26 We follow a convention to include 
an explanatory variable if its PIP is 0.5 or greater in the model. These admitted variables are 
marked in the bold font. Note that a PIP larger than 0.5 corresponds to a t ratio of one or greater 
in absolute value. To conserve space, t ratios are not presented.   
There are a few observations from comparing Tables 2 and 7. First, the explanatory 
variables that are significant in Table 2 are found to be quite robust; that is, PIP =1.00 in Table 7. 
Second, several BMA estimates have signs that are opposite those the corresponding ones in 
Table 2.27 Third, the estimates in Table 7 often have magnitudes differ from the corresponding 
ones in Table 2. However, we cannot generalize and infer which approach yields estimates that 
are consistently larger than the other one. [Last, when we use the PIP of 0.5 as the criterion, 
BMA still identify some other robust variables especially for the 1999-2006 and 1999-2012 
models.  
Despite some differences, the BMA results are in general comparable to those in Table 2.  
The differences may be attributed to the fact that our BMA procedure does not control for a) the 
correlation between potential regressors in estimating all possible model specifications, and b) 
the country-fixed effects. As argued by Montgomery and Nyhan (2010), despite the usefulness of 
the estimation technique, BMA should not be regarded as a panacea for model selection. It would 
best work as an estimation technique to test competing theory-based models or as a robustness 
check to show that the main estimation results are not overly sensitive to model specifications. 
As such, we could state that most of the determinants we found significant are robust with the 
BMA estimation, although the estimation also suggests the possibility of other variables entering 
                                                 
26  The signs in parentheses next to variable names are those in Table 2. 
27  These estimates are: net portfolio liability position, Joneses x Asia, commodity volatility in the 1999-2006 
model; reserve volatility, net debt liability position, net FDI liability position, and the number of currency crises in 
the 2007-2009 model; financial exposure, outward direct investment, and the number of banking crises; and SWF 
and Joneses x Asia in the 1999-2006 period. 
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the models. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Our analysis puts to the fore the changing nature of the hoarding of international reserves. 
We empirically confirmed structural changes associated with new patterns of hoarding IR 
especially in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Among the determinants that received 
more attention in the post-GFC period, we found that the saving rate has been playing an 
important role in determining the level of IR hoarding even before the GFC – emerging markets 
with higher saving rates tend to use higher buffers of IR, partially accounting for the higher 
levels of IR in East Asia in comparison of Latin America. Other variables we newly identified 
include the accessibility to swap lines, implementations of macro-prudential regulations, the 
existence of a sovereignty wealth fund, and the attitude towards outward foreign investment.  
While there is no end in sight for hoarding reserves, some of the newly identified factors 
may mitigate eventual reserve accumulation. Some of the macro prudential measures are 
purported to preemptively prevent excessive credit growth through both macroeconomic and 
microeconomic countercyclical measures while others are particularly targeted to dwarf the 
influx of overseas capital to an overheating economy by imposing capital controls. Hence, an 
implementation of macro-prudential policies may lead to fewer IRs if countries feel less need to 
hold precautionary IR, or it could lead to more IRs if the policies help prevent a drainage of IRs. 
Interestingly, we found the negative impact of macro-prudential policies for developed countries 
and the positive one for developing countries.  
The proliferation of SWFs and possible rebalancing of emerging markets that followed 
aggressive export-led growth before the GFC may reduce reserve/GDP ratios of developing 
countries, as confirmed in the predictive exercises using the latest data. The robustness of the 
“Keeping with the Joneses” effect also suggests potential gains from regional and global steps 
towards deeper use of swap lines and cooperative pooling arrangements.  
These predictions, however, should be taken with a grain of salt. Given the dynamic 
nature of the forces that shape the hoarding of reserves, there is no reason to expect future 
stability in the patterns of hoarding IR. Thus, on top of the relevance of the new determining 
factors, one should be aware of the possible shift in the hoarding behavior in the future.   
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Appendix 1: Data Definitions 
 
Macro/Traditional Variables (X): 
Propensity to import – Imports as a ratio to GDP. 
Reserve volatility – Standard deviations of the growth of IR holding in five year windows (t – 5 
through t – 1) are used. The data are extracted from WDI and IFS. 
Gross saving – Gross saving is used as % of GDP. WDI and WEO. 
Opportunity cost of holding reserves – It is the difference between the long-term government 
bond yields and the U.S. 10-year government bond yields (Previously, I used the Treasury bill 
rates, not any more). For the countries for which the long-term bond yields data are not available, 
“lending rates” from the IFS are used. The data are from WDI and IFS. 
 
Financial and Institutional Variables (Y): 
M2 as % of GDP – M2 as a share of GDP (I used liquid liability ratios in the previous round)  
De jure measure of financial openness – The index is based on Chinn and Ito (2006, 2008) and 
downloaded from http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm . 
Gross Portfolio Exposure – The sum of external assets and liabilities divided by GDP. The data 
are extracted from Lane-Milesi-Ferretti dataset. Previously, we used “net” exposure or change in 
the net exposure.  
Net liabilities for FDI, debt, and portfolio investment – For each of the cross-border investment 
types, the net liabilities are calculated as <external liability minus external asset>, using the 
updated dataset of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007 and updates).  
 
Country Characteristic Variables (D): 
Dummies for the fixed/pegged and crawling peg regimes – The Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) index is 
used to construct the exchange rate regime dummy variables. Their index ranges from 1 “no 
separate legal tender,” to 14 “Freely falling” (with increasing flexibility of exchange rate 
movement) and is a “de facto” index (in contrast to IMF’s “de jure” exchange rate regime 
classification). Here, as in Cheung and Ito, we aggregate these categories into three groups; 
namely “floating,” “Crawling Peg,” and “Fixed/Pegged.” The Reinhart and Rogoff index is 
updated to 2010. For 2011, we assume countries have the same exchange rate regime as in 2010. 
Other characteristic dummy variables are not tested because the estimations are conducted with 
country-fixed effects. 
 
‘New’ Variables (Z) 
Dummy for the sovereign wealth funds (SWF) – Using the data from the SWF Institute 
(http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/), we assign the value of one for the country and 
years in which the country of concern possesses a national-level SWF. 
Dummy for bilateral swap agreements (SWAP) – This dummy takes the value of one if a country 
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is in an agreement of bilateral currency swap (regardless of the currency of the agreement) such 
as the Fed, the ECB, and the Bank of Japan. The data are compiled using website information. 
Dummy for macro prudential policies (MPP) – This dummy takes a value of one if a country has 
in place any of the macro prudential policies Lim, et al. (2013) compiled.  
Gross saving – Gross saving is used as % of GDP. WDI and WEO. 
Commodity TOT Volatility – Using the commodity terms of trade data compiled by Spatafora and 
Tytell (2009), we use the moving five-year standard deviations (in t-5 through t-1) of the change 
in the commodity TOT index as a proxy for commodity TOT volatility.28  
Joneses’ Effects – This variable is supposed to capture regional externality of IR holding and its 
computation is based on Cheung and Qian (2009). It is essentially the average of IR holding in 
the region country i belongs to, but it excludes the level of IR holding of country i itself. The 
regions are: “North and South America,” “Europe,” “East and South Asia,” “Middle-east and 
North Africa,” and “Sub-Saharan Africa.”29 
Outward direct investment (ODI)  – Outward direct investment as a share of GDP. The data are 
extracted from UNCTAD’s database. 
Oil exporters – The dummy is assigned for oil exporters defined by the World Bank or Spatafora  
and Tytell (2009). 
% of commodity exports – The “commodity exports” are the sum of fuel, food, agricultural goods, 
and minerals, all of which are extracted from WDI. It is shown as the share of total exports. 
% of manufacturing exports – The data are from WDI. It is shown as the share of total exports. 
Ratio of goods exports to service exports – Using the BoP data, we calculate the proportion of 
service exports in goods and service exports. Then, we come up with the ratio as (1 minus 
service exports as % of total exports)/(service exports as % of total exports).  
Financial Exposure – We use the ratio of (total external assets + total external liabilities) to GDP. 
The data are based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007 and updates). 
Currency and Banking Crises – We use the dummy for both currency and banking crisis episodes 
that are identified in Aizenman and Ito (2013). For the identification of currency crisis, 
Aizenman and Ito (2013) first calculate the exchange rate market pressure (EMP) against the 
base country (Aizenman, et al., 2008, Eichengreen, et al. 1995, 1996). For the countries whose 
data for the EMP are not available, the crisis dummy is supplemented by the currency crisis 
identification by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Their banking crisis data are essentially based on 
Laeven and Velancia (2008, 2010, 2012). We count the number of past crisis years over t-1 
through t-5 for each type of crises while assigning weights on the crisis dummies depending on 
the year. That is, the crisis variables are calculated as: Dc(t-1) + .95* Dc(t-1) + .90*Dc(t-3) 
+ .85*Dc(t-4) + .80*Dc(t-5). We assume that the weight diminishes by 5% every year, that is, that 
the memory of a crisis among policy makers “depreciates” at the annual rate of 5%.   
  
                                                 
28 The original data are available up to 2009, but we obtained more updated data (up to 2011) from the authors. We 
thank authors for the generosity to share the data.  
29 “Europe” includes Western, Central, and Eastern Europe.  
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Appendix 2: Estimations with the Principal Component Analysis (PCA)  
 
Because we use many candidate variables to investigate the determinants of IR holding, 
admittedly, our regression analysis may involve the risk of having some of the right-hand-side 
variables correlated with each other. Although simple correlation analysis does not report high 
levels of correlation among the explanatory variables (not reported), it is worthwhile for us to 
examine if we still obtain similar results once we control for potential multicollinearity. 
For that purpose, the principal component analysis (PCA) can be a useful tool.30 PCA is 
a statistical tool that extracts, from a matrix composed of p variables and n samples, orthogonal 
linear combinations of the variables that capture the widest variance of the variables. In other 
words, when there is a possibility that some of p variables are correlated with each other, PCA 
would redefine the axes in a way that the distribution of p variables is captured most successfully. 
The linear combinations of the variables are called principal components (PCs), and there are as 
many PCs as the number of the variables tested. The first PC, Y1 as shown below, covers the 
greatest variance of the original variables: (X1, X2, … Xp). 
 
pp XaXaXaY 12121111 ...    (A1) 
 
The second PC, Y2, covers the second greatest variance of the original variables, and 
there are as many PCs as the number of the original variables (p). As the order of the PC 
increases, the extent of an incremental increase in the coverage of the variance of the original 
variables, known as eigenvalues, monotonically decreases while the cumulative coverage of the 
variance monotonically increases and eventually becomes one for the pth PC.31 Because 
eigenvalues decline for higher orders of the PCs, certain PCs with higher orders would not be of 
much use to explain the variation of the original variables. Therefore, using some threshold, one 
can choose some number, say k, of the PCs (0 < k ≤ p) instead of using all p PCs, so that a 
smaller number of variables, that is, k, can be used to represent the variation of the p number of 
the original variables. Many researchers often use the Kaiser criterion as the threshold; the PCs 
whose eigenvalue is less than one will be cut off. Hence, PCA is a useful way to reduce the 
number of the original variables while the created (reduced number of) PCs are, by definition, 
orthogonal to each other. 
The weights, ipa , in equation (A1) are the eigenvectors of the variance-covariance matrix 
of the original data, also known as “component loadings,” indicating the correlation, or 
covariance, of the original Xi with respect to the PC (that is, Yi). ia ’s are derived with the 
constraint that their sum of squares equals one. ia ’s indicate the correlation of the original Xi 
with the PCs. In other words, the PCs are newly defined variables that represent, that is, are 
highly correlated with, some of the original Xi’s.32 For more details on PCA, refer to Anderson 
(2003) and other statistics textbooks.  
Using the PCA, we will examine if we can obtain similar results as in the OLS regression 
exercises. For that, we will take the following steps. 
 
                                                 
30 We thank Yu-chin Chen for suggesting this. 
31 The eigenvalues are the diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix of the principal components. 
32 The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) measure can be used to determine whether the use of the PCs is appropriate or 
not. The KMO, which ranges between zero and one, of above 0.5 is often used as the threshold for the 
appropriateness of the use of PCs. 
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1. Regroup the candidate determinants to the group of macroeconomic/financial variables; 
that of variables pertaining to trade/industrial structure; and that of the Joneses effect 
variables. We do not include in any of the groups the dummy variables for sovereign 
wealth funds, bilateral swap agreements, macroprudential policies, and fixed or crawling 
peg exchange rate regimes.33 
2. Apply the PCA to each of the variable groups for both subsamples of developed and 
developing countries, and select the PCs using the cut-off eigenvalue of 1. However, if 
the PCs chosen with the cut-off eigenvalue of 1 would only yield the cumulated coverage 
of the variance of the original variables less than 75 %, higher orders of PCs would be 
chosen until the cumulated coverage of the variance becomes greater than 75%. 
3. Using all the selected PCs and the other variables that are not used for the PCA, repeat 
the same exercise as in Tables 2 and 3, that is, obtain parsimonious estimation models by 
sequentially dropping the insignificant variables from the specifications.34 
4. Estimate again with the variables that are only weakly correlated with any of the PCs.35 
5. Compare the results from Steps 3 and 4 with those of Tables 2 and 3. 
 
As an example, when we apply the PCA to the group of macroeconomic/financial 
variables for the subsample of developing countries (LDC) from the 1999-2006 period, the 
Kaiser criterion leads us to obtain six PCs for this group of variables (instead of 13), which 
covers 78% of the variation in all of the group’s variables (see the bottom row of Table A1(a)).36 
In Table A1 (a), we can see that the first PC, or PC1 (that alone covers 31% of the variation), is 
positively correlated with the variables for propensity to import and financial exposure, 
suggesting that PC1 is considered to be a variable that represent the possible risk from trade of 
both goods and financial assets.37 PC2 is positively correlated with net FDI liability position and 
gross saving (and therefore represents possible safe guard against capital reversals); PC3 is 
positively correlated with both crisis variables, and so forth. Table A1 (b) report that the group of 
trade structure variables yields two PCs. PC1 is negatively correlated with the share of 
manufacturing exports and positively with the shares of fuel exports and commodity exports. 
After obtaining PCs, we take the above Step 3 to come up with a parsimonious model by 
testing all the PCs and other variables and sequentially dropping the insignificant variables from 
the specifications. We report the result of the parsimonious model in the first column of Table A2 
(a). We also estimate the model again including the variables that are only weakly correlated with 
the PCs such as the variables for the opportunity cost, M2 (as a share of GDP), and net debt 
liability position. We compare these results with those reported in the first column of Table 2 and 
report the comparison in Table 4.   
                                                 
33 Strictly speaking, the PCA should be applied primarily to continuous, normally distributed variables. Discrete 
variables such as categorical variables and dummy variables may bias the estimates (Kolenikov and Angeles, 2004). 
Dummy variables derived from categorical variables (such as the dummy variables for exchange rate regimes we 
use) or those which could not have continuous basis could especially bias the estimates. The compositions of the 
variable groups can be seen in Table A1. 
34 Because the KMO measure indicates that it is not appropriate to obtain the principal components for the Joneses 
effect variables, these variables are included in the estimations as they were in Tables 2 and 3. 
35 Because these variables are not represented by any of the PCs. 
36 We do not report eigenvalues and the coverages of variables’ variations to conserve space. However, they are 
available upon request. 
37 The table omits reporting component loadings with absolute value smaller than 0.40 for easier presentation. 
Hence, the loadings reported in Table A1 indicate those for ‘highly’ correlated variables with the PC. 
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Table A1: Results of the PCA for the LDC Sample 
(1) 1999 – 2006  
 (a): Macro/Traditional variables (# of variables = 13; N = 441; KMO = 0.7080)* 
 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 
Prop. to import 0.4091      
Reserve Vol.     0.7264  
Opp. Cost       
M2 / GDP       
Chinn-Ito     -0.4649  
N. Port. Liab. Pos.    0.4742   
N. Debt Liab. Pos.       
N. FDI Liab. Pos.  0.5334     
Financial Exposure 0.4326      
Gross Saving (%)  0.4077     
Outward Dir. Invest.      0.6683 
Currency crisis   0.5798    
Banking crisis   0.4958 -0.5209   
Cumulative coverage 0.3055 0.4526 0.5587 0.644 0.7165 0.7762 
 
 (b): ‘Trade Structure’ Variables (# of variables = 5; N = 441; KMO = 0.5862)* 
 PC1 PC2 
Commodity Volatility  -0.6208 
% of Manuf. Exports -0.6132  
Ratio of Good to Service Exp.  0.5814 
% of Fuel Exports 0.4383 0.4858 
% of Commodity Exports 0.6122  
Cumulative coverage 0.4948 0.7779 
 
(2) 2007 – 2009 
 
 (c): Macro/Traditional variables (# of variables = 13; N = 182; KMO = 0.7089)* 
 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 
Prop. to import 0.4019     
Reserve Vol.    -0.5979 -0.5160 
Opp. Cost     0.4737 
M2 / GDP      
Chinn-Ito  -0.4122    
N. Port. Liab. Pos.   0.4190   
N. Debt Liab. Pos.      
N. FDI Liab. Pos.  0.5750    
Financial Exposure 0.4503     
Gross Saving (%)  0.5096    
Outward Dir. Invest. 0.4160     
Currency crisis   0.4310 0.4367  
Banking crisis   0.4806 0.4686  
Cumulative coverage 0.3330 0.4721 0.5819 0.6737 0.7524 
 
 (d): ‘Trade Structure’ Variables (# of variables = 5; N = 182; KMO = 0.6212)* 
 PC1 PC2 
Commodity Volatility  0.8272 
% of Manuf. Exports -0.5580  
Ratio of Good to Service Exp.   
% of Fuel Exports 0.4482 -0.5229 
% of Commodity Exports 0.5574  
Cumulative coverage 0.5671 0.7790 
*Notes: Component loadings with absolute value smaller than .40 are omitted from presentation for easier 
interpretation. “KMO” means the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy.  
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(3) 2010 – 2012 
 (e): Macro/Traditional variables (# of variables = 13; N = 154; KMO = 0.7288)* 
 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 
Prop. to import 0.4040     
Reserve Vol.    0.5390  
Opp. Cost   0.4881   
M2 / GDP      
Chinn-Ito  -0.5048    
N. Port. Liab. Pos.      
N. Debt Liab. Pos.      
N. FDI Liab. Pos.  0.5437    
Financial Exposure 0.4430     
Gross Saving (%)  0.4784    
Outward Dir. Invest. 0.4158     
Currency crisis     0.8293 
Banking crisis    0.6384  
Cumulative coverage 0.3589 0.5014 0.5997 0.6884 0.7627 
 
 (f): ‘Trade Structure’ Variables (# of variables = 5; N = 154; KMO = 0.6837)* 
 PC1 PC2 
Commodity Volatility  -0.6740 
% of Manuf. Exports -0.5622  
Ratio of Good to Service Exp.  0.5460 
% of Fuel Exports 0.4203 0.4585 
% of Commodity Exports 0.5637  
Cumulative coverage 0.5839 0.8378 
 
(4) 1999 – 2012 
 
 (g): Macro/Traditional variables (# of variables = 13; N = 777; KMO = 0.7451)* 
 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 
Prop. to import 0.4046      
Reserve Vol.     -0.7101  
Opp. Cost    0.4255   
M2 / GDP      -0.4289 
Chinn-Ito     0.4461 0.4658 
N. Port. Liab. Pos.       
N. Debt Liab. Pos.       
N. FDI Liab. Pos.  0.5458     
Financial Exposure 0.4394      
Gross Saving (%)  0.4581     
Outward Dir. Invest.       
Currency crisis   0.5968    
Banking crisis   0.5586 -0.4568   
Cumulative coverage 0.3248 0.4646 0.5722 0.6568 0.7303 0.7864 
 
 (h): ‘Trade Structure’ Variables (# of variables = 5; N = 777; KMO = 0.6106)* 
 PC1 PC2 
Commodity Volatility  -0.6910 
% of Manuf. Exports -0.5880  
Ratio of Good to Service Exp.  0.5110 
% of Fuel Exports 0.4576 0.4442 
% of Commodity Exports 0.5878  
Cumulative coverage 0.5209 0.7808 
*Notes: Component loadings with absolute value smaller than .40 are omitted from presentation for easier 
interpretation. “KMO” means the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy.  
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Table A2: Determinants of IR holding Using Principal Components – LDC 
 
(a) 1999-2006 
 (1) (2) 
Crawling Peg -0.017 -0.013 
 (0.010)* (0.010) 
Fixed/Peg -0.029 -0.021 
 (0.012)** (0.012)* 
PC2 for macro-fin vars. 0.012 0.015 
 (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
PC3 for macro-fin vars. -0.011 -0.012 
 (0.003)*** (0.004)*** 
PC4 for macro-fin vars. -0.010 -0.009 
 (0.004)** (0.005)** 
Joneses x Asia 2.390 1.897 
 (0.347)*** (0.364)*** 
Joneses x Europe 1.363 1.209 
 (0.380)*** (0.379)*** 
PC1 for Trade/Indust. 
vars. 
0.019 0.024 
 (0.007)** (0.007)*** 
Opportunity Cost  0.019 
  (0.009)** 
M2 (% of GDP)  0.108 
  (0.026)*** 
Net Debt Liab.  -0.008 
  (0.014) 
Constant 0.072 0.007 
 (0.020)*** (0.025) 
N 441 441 
# of countries 70 70 
W/in R2 0.20 0.25 
B/w R2 0.05 0.12 
Overall R2 0.12 0.20 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
(b) 2007-2009 
 (1) (2) 
Swap agr., dummy  0.055 0.054 
 (0.026)** (0.026)** 
PC2 for macro-fin vars. 0.062 0.052 
 (0.019)*** (0.022)** 
Joneses x Asia -2.522 -2.618 
 (0.890)*** (0.879)*** 
M2 (% of GDP)  0.187 
  (0.124) 
Net Debt Liab.  0.128 
  (0.085) 
Constant 0.344 0.245 
 (0.038)*** (0.088)*** 
N 182 182 
# of countries 67 67 
W/in R2 0.16 0.20 
B/w R2 0.12 0.00 
Overall R2 0.12 0.00 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A2 (cont’d): Determinants of IR holding Using Principal Components – LDC 
 
(c) 2010-2012 
 (1) (2) 
SWF, dummy  0.071 0.076 
 (0.034)** (0.034)** 
Swap agr., dummy  -0.035 -0.026 
 (0.016)** (0.017) 
PC2 for macro-fin vars. 0.037 0.050 
 (0.013)*** (0.015)*** 
PC4 for macro-fin vars. -0.033 -0.033 
 (0.010)*** (0.010)*** 
Joneses x Europe -2.120 -2.363 
 (1.009)** (1.012)** 
Joneses x MENA 0.632 0.660 
 (0.113)*** (0.122)*** 
M2 (% of GDP, t-1)  0.001 
  (0.079) 
Net Port. Liab.  0.053 
  (0.113) 
Net Debt Liab.  -0.092 
  (0.046)* 
Constant 0.304 0.295 
 (0.046)*** (0.074)*** 
N 154 154 
# of countries 58 58 
W/in R2 0.39 0.42 
B/w R2 0.05 0.04 
Overall R2 0.06 0.05 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
(d) 1999-2012 
 (1) (2) 
SWF, dummy  -0.027 -0.026 
 (0.014)* (0.014)* 
Macro Prud.Pol., dummy  0.022 0.019 
 (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
Fixed/Peg -0.028 -0.029 
 (0.009)*** (0.009)*** 
PC1 for macro-fin vars. 0.041 0.057 
 (0.004)*** (0.006)*** 
PC2 for macro-fin vars. 0.014 0.016 
 (0.004)*** (0.005)*** 
PC4 for macro-fin vars. -0.013 -0.011 
 (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
PC5 for macro-fin vars. -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.004)*** (0.004)** 
Joneses x Asia 1.037 1.018 
 (0.175)*** (0.175)*** 
Joneses x West Hem. 0.470 0.367 
 (0.236)** (0.241) 
PC1 for Trade/Indust. Vars. 0.014 0.013 
 (0.006)** (0.006)** 
Net Port. Liab.  -0.041 
  (0.040) 
Net Debt Liab.  -0.019 
  (0.016) 
Outward Direct Inv.  -0.391 
  (0.117)*** 
Constant 0.163 0.170 
 (0.011)*** (0.012)*** 
N 777 777 
# of countries 73 73 
W/in R2 0.29 0.30 
B/w R2 0.25 0.29 
Overall R2 0.37 0.42 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 1: Determinants of Holdings of International Reserves -- Developing Countries 
 1999-2006 2007-09 2010-12 1999-2012 
Propensity to Import (t-1) 0.098 0.303 -0.117 0.107 
 (0.035)*** (0.160)* (0.060)* (0.031)*** 
Reserve Volatility -0.013 0.261 -0.147 -0.019 
 (0.007)* (0.187) (0.212) (0.008)** 
M2 (% of GDP, t-1) 0.142 0.050 0.150 0.233 
 (0.026)*** (0.145) (0.094) (0.022)*** 
Net Port. Liab.(t-1) -0.101 0.065 -0.151 0.023 
 (0.040)** (0.127) (0.127) (0.035) 
Constant 0.064 0.029 0.214 0.024 
 (0.018)*** (0.098) (0.072)*** (0.016) 
N 441 182 154 777 
# of countries 70 67 58 73 
Overall R2 0.56 0.34 0.15 0.58 
W/in R2 0.16 0.06 0.07 0.23 
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Estimated with country fixed effects. All the explanatory 
variables are lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity. 
35 
Table 2: Determinants of Holdings of International Reserves – Developing Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1999-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 1999-2012 
Propensity to Import  0.079 0.398  0.096 
 (0.035)** (0.147)***  (0.031)*** 
Reserve Volatility  0.353  -0.021 
  (0.167)**  (0.008)*** 
Opportunity Cost   0.042   
  (0.024)*   
Fixed/Peg    -0.026 
    (0.008)*** 
M2 (% of GDP) 0.096   0.152 
 (0.025)***   (0.026)*** 
Net Portfolio Liability Pos. -0.137    
 (0.038)***    
Net Debt Liability Pos.  0.169   
  (0.073)**   
Net FDI Liability Pos.  0.132   
  (0.081)   
Financial exposure   -0.048 0.010 
   (0.017)*** (0.004)*** 
De jure financial openness   -0.206   
  (0.083)**   
Sovereign Wealth Funds,    0.082 -0.024 
dummy   (0.033)** (0.013)* 
Bilateral swap agreements,    -0.026  
dummy   (0.015)*  
Macro Prudential Policy     0.017 
dummy     (0.007)** 
Gross saving  0.159 0.526 0.235 0.280 
 (0.046)*** (0.202)** (0.091)** (0.043)*** 
Outward Direct Inv. -0.170  0.536  
 (0.077)**  (0.176)***  
Joneses x Asia 1.588 -2.150  0.619 
 (0.348)*** (0.894)**  (0.170)*** 
Joneses x Europe 0.973  -2.506 -0.672 
 (0.351)***  (0.968)** (0.302)** 
Joneses x MENA   0.650  
   (0.107)***  
% of fuel export  0.113   0.182 
 (0.046)**   (0.044)*** 
Commodity Volatility 0.065    
 (0.031)**    
% of commodity exports  0.269   
  (0.120)**   
# of Currency crisis  0.056   
(t-5|t-1)  (0.024)**   
# of Banking crisis   -0.051  
(t-5|t-1)   (0.010)***  
Constant -0.051 -0.027 0.359 -0.024 
 (0.023)** (0.155) (0.052)*** (0.021) 
N 441 182 154 777 
# of countries 70 67 58 73 
Between R2 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.48 
Within R2 0.27 0.35 0.47 0.35 
Overall R2 0.31 0.01 0.01 0.54 
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Estimated with country fixed effects. All the explanatory 
variables, except for reserve volatility and currency and banking crises, are lagged by one year to 
avoid endogeneity. 
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Table 3: Determinants of Holdings of International Reserves – Developed Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1999-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 1999-2012 
Propensity to Import   -0.568   
  (0.245)**   
Reserve Volatility 0.230  0.864  
 (0.054)***  (0.283)***  
Opportunity cost  0.061 -0.155 -0.047 -0.070 
 (0.012)*** (0.038)*** (0.019)** (0.014)*** 
M2 (% of GDP)  -0.110  -0.083 
  (0.031)***  (0.017)*** 
Net Portfolio Liability Pos.   -0.148  
   (0.047)***  
Net Debt Liability Pos. 0.027 0.131 -0.167 -0.099 
 (0.013)** (0.035)*** (0.031)*** (0.013)*** 
Financial exposure -0.003 -0.018 -0.031  
 (0.002)* (0.004)*** (0.010)***  
De jure financial openness  0.275 -1.219  0.548 
 (0.090)*** (0.241)***  (0.145)*** 
Sovereign wealth fund,  -0.036    
dummy (0.011)***    
Bilateral swap agreements,   0.051  0.043 
dummy  (0.009)***  (0.010)*** 
Macro Prudential Policy,  -0.012    
dummy (0.006)*    
Gross saving  -0.311  -1.451  
 (0.091)***  (0.395)***  
Outward Direct Inv.   -0.428 -0.159 
   (0.091)*** (0.056)*** 
Joneses x Asia 0.963   0.918 
 (0.241)***   (0.238)*** 
Joneses x Europe -0.549    
 (0.179)***    
Commodity Volatility -0.201    
 (0.051)***    
% of manufacturing export  0.153 0.667  0.331 
 (0.057)*** (0.389)*  (0.119)*** 
% of fuel export  0.152 1.865  0.674 
 (0.070)** (0.329)***  (0.189)*** 
% of commodity exports  -1.809  -0.468 
  (0.474)***  (0.171)*** 
Ratio of Goods to Service exports   -0.122   
  (0.043)***   
# of Currency crisis    -0.031 
(t-5|t-1)    (0.012)** 
# of Banking crisis -0.015 0.071 0.028 0.015 
(t-5|t-1) (0.004)*** (0.010)*** (0.007)*** (0.003)*** 
Constant -0.208 1.760 0.224 -0.577 
 (0.107)* (0.469)*** (0.119)* (0.180)*** 
N 159 64 58 281 
# of countries 22 22 20 22 
Between R2 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.02 
Within R2 0.58 0.83 0.84 0.53 
Overall R2 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.00 
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Estimated with country fixed effects. All the explanatory 
variables, except for reserve volatility and currency and banking crises, are lagged by one year to 
avoid endogeneity. 
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Table 4: Over-Hoarding Estimates: 2010-2012 
 
 Models (Pred. errors w/out FE) Models (Pred. errors w/ FE) 
 1999-2006 2007-09 2010-2012 1999-2012 1999-2006 2007-09 2010-2012 1999-2012 
Emerging Asia -0.225 0.618 0.087 -0.131 -0.014 0.165 0.002 0.009 
Western Europe 0.079 -0.071 0.411 -0.008 0.065 -0.033 0.000 0.008 
E. & C. Europe -0.041 -0.079 0.246 0.085 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 
Emerging Latin America 0.036 -0.129 -0.275 -0.042 -0.011 -0.004 -0.001 -0.014 
“Fragile Five” -0.196 0.098 -0.185 -0.124 -0.051 0.031 0.001 -0.008 
BRICs -0.143 0.131 -0.100 -0.095 -0.012 0.017 0.001 0.006 
Argentina 0.067 -0.254 -0.232 -0.025 -0.006 -0.032 0.000 -0.010 
Brazil 0.046 -0.118 -0.277 -0.014 0.030 -0.016 0.000 0.019 
Mexico 0.053 0.011 -0.308 -0.012 0.029 0.040 0.000 0.012 
China -0.265 0.742 -0.097 -0.139 0.018 0.124 0.000 0.019 
India -0.483 0.414 -0.238 -0.304 -0.171  0.006 -0.035 
Indonesia -0.473 0.495 -0.331 -0.260 -0.116 0.073 0.000 -0.021 
Korea -0.412 0.699 -0.161 -0.254 -0.137 0.123 0.000 -0.049 
Malaysia -0.253 0.603 0.014 -0.125 -0.082 0.100 0.000 -0.043 
Thailand -0.173 0.739 0.121 -0.028 0.066 0.156 0.000 0.080 
South Africa 0.019 -0.192 -0.209 -0.095 0.028 -0.004 0.000 0.008 
Turkey -0.089 -0.003 0.121 0.052 -0.029 0.070 0.000 -0.012 
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Table 5: The Proxy of Over-hoarding and Exchange Rate Depreciation in 2012-13  
Dep. Var.: % of Depreciation 2012-13 
 Prediction errors 2010-12 Prediction errors as of 2012 
Model 1999-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 1999-2012 1999-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 1999-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Pred. errors. -0.065 -0.055 -0.018 -0.101 -0.055 -0.077 -0.061 -0.114 
(0.031)** (0.032)* (0.016) (0.052)* (0.030)* (0.042)* (0.035)* (0.061)* 
Constant 0.021 0.031 0.016 0.019 0.027 0.038 0.018 0.026 
 (0.008)** (0.011)*** (0.009)* (0.008)** (0.010)*** (0.013)*** (0.010)* (0.009)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.07 
N 75 59 68 78 59 49 52 63 
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors are robust standard errors. 
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Table 6: Comparison b/w OLS-FE and PCA Estimation Results – Developing Countries 
1999-2006 OLS-FE PC 2007-2009 OLS-FE PC 2010-2012 OLS-FE PC 1999-2012 OLS-FE PC 
Propensity to Import +  Propensity to Import +  Financial Exposure –  Propensity to Import + + 
M2 (% of GDP) + (+) Reserve Volatility +  SWF + + Reserve Volatility – + 
Net Portfolio Liab. – – Opportunity Cost +  Bilateral swap – – Fixed/Peg – – 
Gross saving + + Net Debt Liab. +  Gross saving + + M2 (% of GDP) +  
Outward Direct Inv. –  Net FDI Liab. Pos. – + Outward Direct Inv. +  Financial Exposure + + 
Joneses x Asia + + Chinn-Ito – – Joneses x Europe – – SWF – – 
Joneses x Europe + + Gross saving + + Joneses x MENA + + Macro Prudential + + 
% of fuel export + + Joneses x Asia – – # of Banking crisis – – Gross saving + + 
Commodity Volatility +  Commodity exports +     Joneses x Asia + + 
   # of Currency crisis +     Joneses x Europe –  
       % of fuel export + + 
      
N 441 N 182 N 154 N 777 
# of countries 70 # of countries 67 # of countries 58 # of countries 73 
B/w R2 0.21 0.05 B/w R2 0.01 0.12 B/w R2 0.01 0.05 B/w R2 0.48 0.25 
W/in R2 0.27 0.20 W/in R2 0.35 0.16 W/in R2 0.47 0.39 W/in R2 0.35 0.29 
Overall R2 0.31 0.12 Overall R2 0.01 0.12 Overall R2 0.01 0.06 Overall R2 0.54 0.37 
    
Other estimates found associated by PCA: Other estimates found associated by PCA: Other estimates found associated by PCA: Other estimates found associated by PCA: 
  Crawling Peg (-); fixed/Peg (-); net FDI 
Liab.(+); currency crisis (-); banking crisis 
(+/-); Chinn-Ito (-); manufacturing exp. (-); 
(Opp. Cost (+))  
Swap (+);  Chinn-Ito (-); net FDI Liab.(+); Reserve vol. 
(-) 
net FDI Liab.(+); Opp. Cost (-); banking crisis 
(+); Chinn-Ito (-); Joneses Westhem. (+); 
manufacturing exp. (-); Comm. exp. (+); (ODI 
(-))
    
 Note: The signs in parentheses in the “PCA” columns indicate they are based on the results of the estimations where the variables that are not highly correlated 
with any of the PCs are included in the estimation (that is, models shown in column (2) of each table). 
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Table 7: Estimation Results of BMA – Developing Countries 
1999-2006 
(N = 441) Coeff. PIP 
2007-2009 
(N = 182) Coeff. PIP 
2010-2012 
(N = 154) Coeff. PIP 
1999-2012  
(N = 777) Coeff. PIP 
Propensity to Import (+) 0.168 1.00 Propensity to Import (+) 0.239 1.00 Financial Exposure (-) 0.054 1.00 Propensity to Import (+) 0.159 1.00 
M2 (% of GDP) (+) 0.140 1.00 Reserve Volatility (+) -0.204 1.00 SWF (+) 0.008 1.00 Reserve Volatility (-) -0.039 1.00 
Net Portfolio Liab. (-) 0.078 1.00 Opportunity Cost (+) 0.024 1.00 Bilateral swap (-) -0.050 1.00 Fixed/Peg (-) -0.018 1.00 
Gross saving (+) 0.127 1.00 Net Debt Liab. (+) -0.080 1.00 Gross saving (+) 0.670 1.00 M2 (% of GDP) (+) 0.152 1.00 
Outward Direct Inv. (-) -0.586 1.00 Net FDI Liab. Pos. (-) -0.056 1.00 Outward Direct Inv. (+) -0.639 1.00 Financial Exposure (+) 0.032 1.00 
Joneses x Asia (+) -0.011 1.00 Chinn-Ito (-) -0.060 1.00 Joneses x Europe (-) -0.548 1.00 SWF (-) 0.028 1.00 
Joneses x Europe (+) 0.167 1.00 Gross saving (+) 0.475 1.00 Joneses x MENA (+) 0.189 1.00 Macro Prudential (+) 0.037 1.00 
% of fuel export (+) 0.083 1.00 Joneses x Asia (-) -0.369 1.00 # of Banking crisis (-) 0.000 1.00 Gross saving (+) 0.312 1.00 
Commodity Volatility (+) -0.075 1.00 Commodity exports (+) 0.027 1.00 Net Debt Liab. -0.136 0.92 Joneses x Asia (+) -0.121 1.00 
Financial Exposure 0.030 1.00 # of Currency crisis (+) -0.042 1.00 M2 (% of GDP) 0.157 0.91 Joneses x Europe (-) -0.016 1.00 
Net Debt Liab. -0.070 1.00 M2 (% of GDP) 0.196 1.00 Fixed/Peg -0.062 0.70 % of fuel export (+) 0.103 1.00 
Reserve Volatility -0.031 0.99 % of fuel export 0.199 0.94 % of Manuf. Exp. -0.063 0.38 Joneses MENA 0.300 1.00 
Crawl Peg 0.030 0.99 Fixed/Peg -0.083 0.93 Reserve Volatility -0.096 0.35 Outward Dir. Inv. -0.703 1.00 
Joneses MENA 0.290 0.97 Financial Exposure 0.022 0.81 % of fuel export 0.036 0.29 Net Debt Liab. -0.077 1.00 
Macro Prudential 0.029 0.81 Outward Dir. Inv. -0.897 0.73 # of Currency crisis 0.018 0.28 Crawl Peg 0.036 0.97 
Net FDI Liab. 0.046 0.81 Joneses x Europe -0.453 0.55 Chinn-Ito -0.019 0.25 Chinn-Ito -0.037 0.89 
SWF 0.016 0.48 # of Banking Crisis -0.340 0.45 Joneses x Asia -0.250 0.18 Joneses SSA 0.061 0.31 
Joneses SSA 0.022 0.22 Joneses West Hem. 0.025 0.45 Joneses West Hem. -0.455 0.17 Joneses West Hem. -0.061 0.29
Joneses West Hem. -0.045 0.21 Joneses MENA 0.041 0.35 Joneses SSA -0.425 0.17 Bilateral swap -0.007 0.23 
# of Currency crisis -0.001 0.16 Joneses SSA -0.069 0.18 % of Commd. Exp. -0.001 0.17 % of Manuf. Exp. -0.001 0.06 
Chinn-Ito -0.001 0.08 Bilateral swap -0.007 0.13 Crawl Peg 0.006 0.14 # of Currency Crisis 0.000 0.06 
% of Manuf. Exp. 0.001 0.06 Goods/Serv. Exp. Ratios 0.002 0.12 Net Portfolio Liab. -0.018 0.1 % of Commd. Exp. -0.002 0.05
Fixed/Peg 0.000 0.06 Crawl Peg 0.003 0.10 Commodity Volatility 0.016 0.08 Commodity Volatility 0.001 0.05 
% of Commd. Exp. -0.001 0.06 Net Portfolio Liab. -0.005 0.08 Goods/Serv. Exp. Ratios 0.001 0.08 Net Portfolio Liab. 0.001 0.04 
Swap 0.001 0.05 Macro Prudential 0.001 0.07 Net FDI Liab. 0.004 0.08 Goods/Serv. Exp. Ratios 0.000 0.04 
Goods/Serv. Exp. Ratios 0.000 0.05 Commodity Volatility 0.006 0.07 Macro Prudential 0.002 0.07 Opp. Cost 0.000 0.04 
Opp. Cost -0.000 0.05 SWF 0.000 0.06 Propensity to Import -0.002 0.06 Net FDI Liab. 0.000 0.04 
# of Banking Crisis 0.000 0.05 % of Manuf. Exp. 0.007 0.06 Opp. Cost 0.000 0.05 # of Banking Crisis 0.000 0.04 
        
Notes: “PIP” refers to posterior inclusion probability, that is, the posterior probability that a variable is to be included in the model. The PIP of 0.5 approximately 
corresponds to a t ratio of one in absolute value. Figures in bold are the estimates whose PIP’s are 0.50 or greater. The explanatory variables shown above the 
horizontal line are the “focus regressors” and those below are “auxiliary regressors.”
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Figure 1: International Reserve Holding as a ratio to GDP (a) and to the world total (b) 
(a) IR Holding as % of GDP 
 
Note: For the country groups, the group’s aggregate IR is divided by the group’s aggregated GDP 
 
(b) IR Holding as % of the World’s IR Total 
 
Note: For the country groups, the group’s aggregate IR is divided the world’s total IR
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Figure 2: Predictions with Different Estimation Models 
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Figure 2-cont: Predictions with Different Estimation Models 
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Figure 3: Actual vs. Predicted Levels of IR Holding 
(a) Predictions based on the 1999-2006 model 
 
(b) Predictions based on the 1999-2012 model 
 
Note: For clarity purposes, the observations with actual or predicted IR levels greater than 80% (of 
GDP) are omitted from presentation. 
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Figure 4: Over-hoarding and Exchange Rate Depreciation 
(a) 1999-2006 model    (b) 2007-09 model 
 
 
(c) 2010-12 model     (d) 1999-2012 model 
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